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Abstract 
 
In this paper the Kullback-Leibler notion of discrepancy (Kullback and Leibler, 1951) is used to propose 
a measure of multigroup segregation over a set of organizational units within a multivariate framework. 
Among the main results of the paper it is established that the Mutual Information index of segregation, 
M, first proposed by Theil and Finizza (1971), whose ranking has been fully characterized in terms of 
seven ordinal axioms by Frankel and Volij (2009), can be decomposed to isolate a term which captures 
segregation conditional on any vector of covariates. Furthermore, consistent estimators for M and the 
terms in its decomposition are proposed, and their asymptotic properties are obtained. The usefulness 
of the approach is illustrated by looking at patterns of multiracial segregation across public schools in 
the U.S. for the academic years 1989-90 and 2005-06. It is found that most within-cities segregation and 
a significant part of within-districts segregation is accounted for by county-level income per capita and 
wages per job, and teachers per pupil at school level. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
Social scientists have long been interested in the measurement of occupational segregation by 
gender, as well as in residential and educational segregation by ethnic group.2 Mathematically, these 
problems are similar in the sense that both involve summarizing by means of a real number the 
information contained in the frequency of individuals (workers, residents, students) over a finite set of 
organizational units (occupations, neighbourhoods, schools) and a finite set of demographic groups 
(defined in terms of gender, racial, or ethnic categories). Such a real number is referred to as an index of 
segregation.  For concreteness, this paper will use the example of school segregation in the multiracial 
case. The main question we address is how to account for racial group and school differences in 
socioeconomic variables in the measurement of segregation.  
To place this issue into a proper perspective, think of school segregation at a national level as 
arising from two forces. Firstly, given the partition of cities into school districts, school segregation 
arises from politically determined segregative or integrative rules in the assignment of students to 
schools within a given district (see inter alia Rivkin, 1994, and Clotfelter, 1999). Secondly, imagine a 
situation without within-districts school segregation, that is, a situation where school district authorities 
all over the country are able to implement a policy that reproduces in all schools the racial mix of the 
district to which they belong. In this scenario, the student population would still experience some 
segregation arising from the residential choices adopted by their parents or caretakers: as long as the 
racial composition at the school district level differs from the racial composition at the city and/or the 
national level, there will be between-cities and between-districts (or within-cities) school segregation in 
the country as a whole. Preferences and opportunities behind residential decisions may directly depend 
on a number of socioeconomic variables, giving rise to the main issue addressed in this paper. Assume, 
for instance, that there is a statistical association between student race and household income levels. In 
                                                
2 For a treatise on occupational segregation by gender, see Fluckiber and Silber (1999), and for a recent useful contribution 
on residential and school segregation, see Reardon and Firebaugh (2002).  
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so far as household income is a potential determinant of residential and school choice, it can be said that 
multigroup school segregation may be partially due to income inequality. Therefore, for both 
explanatory and policy reasons it is important to identify the extent to which the value of segregation 
arises from income and other socioeconomic characteristics.  
In the absence of a better strategy, one can discretize the vector of socioeconomic controls and 
use indices of segregation which are additively decomposable into between and within discrete 
categories, such as in Reardon et al. (2000), Mora and Ruiz-Castillo (2003), and Frankel and Volij (2009). 
However, this strategy has a practical limitation and a conceptual drawback. The practical limitation 
stems from the curse of dimensionality: to avoid serious aggregation bias, one should consider as many 
categories as possible for each control, but with usual sample sizes this is implementable in practice only 
when the vector of controls has few dimensions. The conceptual drawback is due to the absence of a 
clear interpretation of the between term as the used discrete categories are only arguable approximations 
of the actual values . Therefore, the use of indices which are additively decomposable into between and 
within discrete categories only partially answers this question because it does not deal properly with 
many continuous controls.  
Other researchers have tried to develop notions of conditional segregation which should be 
implementable in a general multivariate framework. Frequently, their ultimate purpose is to assess to 
what extent segregation can be explained by the determinants of individual choice; to do so, they 
borrow the tools used in the literature on discrete choice. For example, in their analysis of occupational 
segregation, Spriggs and Williams (1996) propose a modified Duncan dissimilarity index which uses  
gender (and race) differences in estimated probabilities of being in an occupation obtained from 
multinomial logit models. Following closely Carrington and Troske (1997), other researchers have 
proposed indices of segregation which attempt to control for systematic differences in the distribution 
of covariates across groups. For example, in the context of occupational segregation by immigrant 
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status, Aslund and Skans (2009) propose estimating the propensity score for each group given the vector 
of characteristics to create the benchma rk random allocation (conditional on the covariates) for any 
segregation index.3 They then develop a test of conditional segregation using an index of exposure. The 
most important drawback of these strategies is that the indices obtained are neither characterized in 
terms of axiomatic properties, nor related in an unambiguous way to indices which are fully 
characterized. This implies that although the procedures suggested sometimes have a clear intuitive 
appeal, it is not clear how they relate to unconditional measures of segregation and one cannot be 
certain of what the resulting index actually measures. 
In this paper, a multivariate statistical framework to analyse multigroup school segregation is set 
up by borrowing the Kullback and Leibler (1951) notion of discrepancy from Information Theory. A 
measure of segregation, M, is then proposed and shown to satisfy several important properties. 
Firstly, M coincides with the Mutual Information index, first proposed by Theil and Finizza (1971) 
as a measure of racial school segregation at district level, and whose ranking has been recently 
characterized by Frankel and Volij (2009) in terms of seven ordinal desirable axioms. 
Secondly, Frankel and Volij (2009) show that, for any variable d which partitions the set of schools 
or the set of racial categories, M is strongly decomposable and the within term in this decomposition can 
be interpreted as segregation conditional on d. In this paper, this result is generalized to condition 
segregation on any vector of (possibly continuous) student and school characteristics x. In particular, the 
M index can be decomposed into a between term, ,BKLM  which is a Kullback-Leibler measure of 
discrepancy and captures the statistical dependence between race status (or school membership) and x, 
and a within term, ,WKLM  which captures multigroup school segregation conditional on x. Because 
B
KLM  
and WKLM  are independent, in the sense that it is possible to introduce changes in the population to 
eliminate conditional segregation WKLM  keeping conditioning segregation 
B
KLM  constant, this 
                                                
3 See also Hellerstein and Neumark (2008) and Kalter (2000) for related methodological proposals.  
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decomposition allows us to answer questions such as “to what extent is racial segregation at school level 
associated with racial differences in socioeconomic variables?”4 Moreover, since BKLM  and 
W
KLM  are 
functions of terms that can be interpreted as qualitative response models, the decomposition provides 
an intuitive unifying econometric framework for studies of segregation using segregation indices and 
econometric models. 
Thirdly, since segregation measures are routinely computed using samples, it is usually of interest 
to study their statistical significance. The simplest approach to this problem involves reporting t-
statistics using computer intensive methods such as the bootstrap as in Boisso et al. (1994). A related 
approach consists of standardizing the segregation measure, using as mean and standard deviations 
estimates obtained from resampling under random assignment into groups and organizational units, as 
in Carrington and Troske (1997). Other authors have made use of a statistical framework for the 
empirical analysis of segregation, as in Kakwani (1994). In this paper, for any sample of size T, 
estimators for both the M index, ˆ ,TM  and also the between and within terms in its decomposition,  
ˆ B
TM  and ˆ ,
W
TM  are proposed using the principle of analogy. ˆ TM  is shown to be a monotonic 
transformation of the likelihood-ratio statistic for testing statistical independence between school 
membership and racial status. Furthermore, when the vector of covariates x only includes discrete 
variables, it is shown that ˆ WTM  can be interpreted as a monotone transformation of the likelihood-ratio 
statistic for testing statistical independence between school membership and racial status given x. 
Finally, sufficient conditions are provided to obtain under all segregation scenarios the asymptotic 
properties of ˆ ,TM ˆ ,
B
TM  and ˆ ,
W
TM  both in the case when all variables are discrete and also when there is 
at least one continuous variable in x. 
                                                
4 In the field of income inequality, between -groups income inequality can also be interpreted as the amount by which overall 
income inequality is reduced when the differences between subgroup income means are eliminated by making them equal to 
the population income mean (see, inter alia, Shorrocks, 1984). As shown by Mora and Ruiz-Castillo (2009), the corresponding 
interpretation is logically impossible in segregation studies. 
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To summarize, it has been shown elsewhere that M is well grounded on an axiomatic notion of 
segregation. In this paper, we show that it can be used to estimate the level of segregation which does 
not arise from the statistical association between the demographic groups and any set of covariates. The 
usefulness of the approach is illustrated by applying it to the analysis of multiracial segregation in the 
U.S. public schools.  More specifically, we study to what extent the measures of within-cities and within-
districts segregation are due to the statistical association between racial group membership and three 
continuous variables: county income per capita and wages per job, and teachers per pupil at district and 
school level. Results show that around 64% and 20% of, respectively,  within-cities and within-districts 
segregation is accounted for by these three covariates, and that these shares are strongly significant. 
The rest of the paper contains four sections. Section 2 sets up the general statistical framework, 
and defines M and its decomposition in a multivariate framework. Section 3 proposes estimators 
ˆ ,TM ˆ ,
B
TM  and ˆ
W
TM  and presents the asymptotic results. Section 4 contains the empirical illustration, 
while Section 5 offers some concluding comments. 
 
II. A GENERAL STATISTICAL MODEL OF MULTIGROUP SCHOOL 
SEGREGATION 
 
II. 1. Measures of Segregation 
 
It is useful to refer to a specific segregation problem. For consistency with the empirical 
illustration in Section IV, the case discussed throughout the paper is the multigroup school segregation 
problem. Assume a city X consisting of N schools, indexed by n = 1,…, N. Each student belongs to any 
of G racial groups, indexed by g = 1,…, G. The data available can be organized into the following G x N 
matrix: 
 { }
11 1
1
,X
¼é ù
ê ú= = ê ú
ê ú¼ë û
M O M
N
gn
G GN
t t
t
t t
 (1)  
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where tgn is the number of individuals of racial group g attending school n, so that 
1 1
N G
gn
n g
t t
= =
= åå  is the 
total student population.  
The information contained in the joint absolute frequencies of racial groups and schools, tgn, is 
usually summarized by means of numerical indices of segregation. Let X(G, N) be the set of all cities 
with G groups and N schools. A segregation index S is a real valued function defined in X(G, N), where 
S(X) provides the extent of school segregation for any city XÎX(G, N). Let pgn = tgn/t, and denote by 
{ } ,
1, 1
,
G N
gn gn g n
P p
= =
= the joint distribution of racial groups and schools in a city XÎX(G, N). In the 
following section, the discussion will be restricted to indices that capture a relative view of segregation in 
which all that matters is the joint distribution, i.e. indices which admit a representation as a function of 
Pgn.
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II. 2. A Kullback-Leibler Measure of Segregation 
 
Consider the probability space ( ), , mW F  where W  is the set of possible samples { }, , x Î Wg n  
where x Î L Ì ¡k  is a vector of k covariates. F is the s-algebra of subsets of ,W and m is a measure of 
the probability of the events in F. Assume that there are two absolutely continuous measures with 
respect to m, m1 and m2, and two generalized density functions, 1( , , )f g n x  and 2 ( , , ),f g n x  such that  
 ( ) ( , , ) ,  1, 2,xm m= =òi i
E
E f g n d i   
for all .EÎF  The elements in x may be univariate or multivariate, discrete or continuous, qualitative or 
quantitative, and the generalized density functions fi are known at most up to a parameter vector. 
Consider the partition of W  into G x N sets ( ){ }, , :  ,  ,x x= Î = = Î LgnD r s r g s nF and let  
                                                
5 This property, satisfied by most segregation indices, is referred to as Size Invariance in James and Taeuber (1985). 
8 
 
 ( ), ( , , ) , 1,2,xm m= =ò
gn
i i
D
g n f r s d i  
so that the probability that a student is of race g and belongs to school n under the probability measure 
m1 is 1 1( , ) ( , , ) ,xm m= = ò
g n
gn
D
p g n f r s d where 0gnp ³  and 
1 1
1.
G N
gn
g n
p
= =
=åå The marginal probabilities for 
race status and school membership are 
1
N
g gn
n
p p·
=
= å  and 
1
,
G
n gn
g
p p·
=
= å  respectively. For all g and n such 
that ( ), 0, 1, 2,i g n im > =  the generalized conditional density given race and school status is 
( )
( )
( , , )| , .
,
xx
m
= ii
i
f g nf g n
g n
 Following Kullback (1959), a Kullback-Leibler, KL, measure of discrepancy 
between f1 and f2 is defined as: 
 11
2
( , , )
(1:2) ( , , )log .
( , , )
x
x
x
m
æ ö
= ç ÷
è ø
ò
f g n
I f g n d
f g n
 (1) 
Let Hi , i =1, 2, represent the hypothesis that ( , , )xg n  belongs to the statistical population with 
probability measure ,im and define the logarithm of the likelihood ratio, 1
2
( , , )log ,
( , , )
x
x
æ ö
ç ÷
è ø
f g n
f g n
 as the 
information in ( , , )xg n  for discrimination in favour of H1 against H2.
6 Then I(1:2) can be interpreted as 
the mean discrepancy (or information for discrimination) in favour of H1 against H2  per observation 
from m1 (see Kullback, 1959, p. 5). 
Define the conditional probability of school membership n given race status g as | ,
gn
n g
g
p
p
p ·
=  and 
let { }| | 1
N
n g n g n
P p
=
=  represent the conditional distribution of students from group g across schools. 
                                                
6 The base of the logarithm is immaterial, providing essentially a unit of measure. The natural logarithm is used throughout 
the paper. 
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Similarly, define the conditional probability of racial status g given school membership n as | ,
gn
g n
n
p
p
p·
=  
and denote by { }| | 1
G
g n g n g
P p
=
=  the racial mix within school n. Indices in the segregation literature 
associate the absence of segregation with two situations. Firstly, racial groups are not segregated if the 
relative frequency with which a student attends school n is constant, regardless of her racial group, i.e. 
pn|g = p•n .
7 Secondly, the racial composition at all schools is fully representative of the population if the 
relative frequency with which students belong to racial group g is constant regardless of the school 
which they attend, i.e. pg|n = pg•.
8 These two notions of absence of segregation are equivalent and 
coincide w ith the concept of statistical independence between race status and school membership: 
  · · · ·= Û = Û =| | .g n g n g n ng g np p p p p p p   
Under the following three assumptions the KL notion of discrepancy between dependence and 
independence of race and school membership becomes a measure of segregation. For all  g = 1,…, G, n 
= 1,…, N, and x Î L Ì ¡k : 
A1 : 0.gnp >  
A2 : ( ) ( )| , | , 0 as, 1,2.x x= > =if g n f g n i  
A3 : ( )2
1 1
, .
N G
g n gn gn
n g
g n p p p pm · ·
= =
æ öæ ö= = ç ÷ç ÷
è øè ø
å å  
A1 eliminates from consideration combinations of races and schools that are a priori impossible to 
observe. A2 ensures that the marginal probabilities pgn are sufficient statistics with respect to the measure 
of discrepancy, so that no information is lost by disregarding x. Finally, A3 identifies H2 with the notion 
                                                
7 Absence of segregation in this sen se is consistent with the notion of segregation as “evenness”, advocated by James and 
Taeuber (1985), according to which segregation is seen as the tendency of racial groups to have different distributions across 
schools. 
8 Absence of segregation in this sense follows the idea of “representativeness”, emphasized by Frankel and Volij (2009), 
which asks to what extent schools have different racial compositions from the population as a whole, and it is closely related 
to the idea of “isolation” distinguished by Massey and Denton (1988) in the two-group case. 
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of statistical independence between race and school membership. Given equation (1), the following 
remark results.  
Remark 1: Under assumptions A1 to A3, the notion of discrepancy (1:2)I coincides with the 
Mutual Information index, M, i.e. 
 
G G
|
|
g=1 1 g=1 1
(1 :2) log log .
N N
gn n g
gn g n g
n ng n n
p p
I p p p M
p p p·= =· · ·
æ ö æ ö
= = =ç ÷ ç ÷ç ÷ è øè ø
åå å å   
Theil (1972) shows that M is bounded. The lower bound 0 is achieved whenever ng g np p p· ·=  for 
all g and n, while the upper bound is { }min log( ), log( ) .G N  
II. 2. Multigroup School Conditional Segregation 
Assumptions A1 to A3 do not require independence between race status (or school membership) 
and any of the covariates in x. Thus, as is pointed out in the Introduction, it will be generally of interest 
to evaluate the extent to which M can be attributed to the statistical association between the covariates x 
and the racial groups (or schools). Without loss of generality, let us consider the statistical association 
between racial groups and covariates x.  
It is always possible to factorize the generalized density ( , , )xif g n  as 
( , , ) ( | , ) ( , ),x x x=i i if g n f n g f g where 
1
( , ) ( , , ), 1, 2.
N
i i
n
f g f g n i
=
= =åx x Therefore, any measure of 
discrepancy (1:2)I  can always be decomposed into two terms:  
   
1
1
2
1
1
2
( , )
(1 :2) ( , , )log
( , )
( | , )
        + ( , , )log .
( | , )
x
x
x
x
x
x
m
m
æ ö
= ç ÷
è ø
æ ö
ç ÷
è ø
ò
ò
f g
I f g n d
f g
f n g
f g n d
f n g
 (2)  
The first term captures the discrepancy between 1( , )xf g  and 2 ( , ),xf g  while the second term captures 
the discrepancy in conditional school assignment rules 1( | , )xf n g  and 2( | , ).xf n g  In addition to A1, 
A2, and A3, the following four assumptions are sufficient to obtain a decomposition of M so that one 
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term can be interpreted as racial discrepancy across covariates and the other term can be interpreted as 
conditional school segregation: 
A4 : ( ) ( )1 , | ; ( )x x x=f g f g fa  where ( | ; )x·f a  is known up to parameter vector .aÎ ¡ka  
A5 : ( )2 , ( )x x·= gf g p f  with ( | ; ) ( )
x
x x xa·
ÎL
= ògp f g f d  not uniquely identified by a . 
A6 : ( ) ( )1 , | , | ;  where ( , | ; )x x x= · ·f g n f g n fb b  is known up to parameter vector bÎ ¡kb  
which is not a function of ( ),g a where 1( ,..., ) .· ·= tGp pg  
A7 : ( ) ( )2 , | ( | ; ) | ;x x x=f g n f g f na b  where ( ) ( )
1
| ; , | ; .x x
=
ì üï ï= í ý
ï ïî þ
å
G
g
f n f g nb b  
Under assumptions A1 to A7, the M index can be decomposed into a between term which 
captures the statistical dependence between race status (or school membership) and x, and a within term 
which captures multigroup school segregation conditional on x (see Proposition 1 in Appendix): 
   ( , ) ( , )= +B WM M Mg a a b  (3) 
where 
  
1
( | ; )
( , ) ( ) ( | ; )log
x
x
x x x
= ·ÎL
ì üæ öï ï= ç ÷í ýç ÷ï ïè øî þ
åò
G
B
g g
f g
M f f g d
p
a
g a a   
and 
  
1 1
( , | ; )( , ) ( ) ( , | ; )log .
( | ; ) ( | ; )x
xx x x
x x= =ÎL
ì üæ öï ï= í ýç ÷
ï ïè øî þ
ååò
G N
W
g n
f g nM f f g n d
f g f n
ba b b
a b
 
The term ( , )BM g a  identifies the level of segregation which would remain if there were no 
segregation after controlling for the statistical dependence between the vector of covariates x and racial 
status. Since ( , )WM a b  is the level of segregation which is not related to racial discrepancy by 
covariates x, it can be referred to as school segregation by race conditional on x. 
Decomposition (3) is appealing for at least two reasons. Firstly, ( , )WM a b  and ( , )BM g a  are 
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independent in the sense that it is possible to introduce changes in the densities to eliminate ( , )WM a b  
keeping ( , )BM g a  constant. Secondly, conditional densities ( | ; ),xf n b  and 
( | , ; ) ( , | ; )/ ( | ; )f n g f g n f gºx x xb b b  can be interpreted as qualitative response models which stem 
from economic agents’ utility maximizing choices under constraints. Thus, decomposition (3) provides 
an intuitive, unifying, econometric framework for studies of segregation using segregation indices and 
qualitative response econometric models. 
Kullback (1959) points out that any KL discrepancy can be recursively decomposed into more 
than two terms. This is trivially seen with decomposition (3), as the first term is itself a KL discrepancy 
measure and, hence, it can itself be decomposed. A direct application of this property to the problem of 
multigroup school segregation permits the decomposition of M into three terms capturing between-
cities, within-cities, and within-districts school segregation.9 For reasons of brevity, we leave to the 
reader the details of decompositions of more than two terms in the model. 
One final point needs to be clarified. Suppose that all covariates x are discrete, and that they 
part ition the set of schools into disjoint subsets, such as when schools in a city are organized into a set 
of school districts. More specifically, assume that each school belongs to one of K different school 
districts and let gndp  denote the proportion of students of racial group g at school n within district d, 
| .gnd gnn dp p Î=  Define g dp ·  as the joint probability of race and district membership and let ··dp  and |gndp  
denote the marginal distribution of districts and the joint distribution of race and school membership 
conditional on district d, respectively. Finally, let |g dp ·  and |n dp·  be the marginal distributions within 
district d of race and school membership. It has previously been shown that the M index is 
decomposable for any partition of the schools into K school districts into a between and a within term:10 
                                                
9 See also Hernanz et al. (2005) for an application of this principle in the context of occupational segregation by gender and 
Frankel and Volij (2009) for sequential clustering of racial categories in multiracial school segregation. 
10 See Frankel and Volij (2009)  and Mora and Ruiz-Castillo (2009). For the two-group case, see Mora and Ruiz-Castillo (2003, 
2004), and Herranz et al. (2005). 
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 M = MB + MW, (4) 
where 
1 1
log
K G
g dB
g d
d g g d
p
M p
p p
·
·
= = · ··
æ ö
= ç ÷ç ÷
è ø
åå and ||
1 1 | |
log .
K G
g n dW
d g n d
k n d g g d n d
p
M p p
p p··= Î = · ·
æ ö
= ç ÷ç ÷
è ø
å åå  
How does decomposition (4) relate to decomposition (3)? If x( ) ,df p··=  x |( | , ) ,g df g p ·=a  
x |( , | ; ) ,gndf g n p=b  and x |( | ; ) ,ndf n p·=b  it can readily be shown that ( , ) =
B BM Mg a and 
( , ) .=W WM Ma b  Thus, when the vector of covariates includes only discrete variables, the general 
decomposition in equation (3) exactly matches the decomposition of the M index previously proposed 
in the literature for any partition of schools (or groups) as in equation (4). 
 
III. ESTIMATION AND ASYMPTOTIC PROPERTIES 
III.1. Estimation and Asymptotics of the M Index 
Assume that a sample of T observations from students with information on their race status, 
school membership, and covariates  ix , { } 1, , ,
T
i i i i
g n
=
x  is available. Let Tgn be the number of students of 
racial group g in school n, so that 
= =
= åå
1 1
.
N G
gn
n g
T T  Let 
1
0
N
g gn
n
T T·
=
= >å  and 
1
0.
G
n gn
g
T T·
=
= >å Note that 
under assumptions A1 to A7, race and school status are jointly distributed as a nonparametric 
multinomial model. Without loss of generality, denote by 
{ }( , ) : 1,..., , 1,..., ,( , ) ( , )= = = ¹cGN g n g G n N g n G N  the set of all race and school combinations except 
combination ( , ).G N  Then the marginal probabilities of race and school membership are fully identified 
by the vector 111 21 , 1( , ,..., ) ,
t GN
G Np p p
-
-= Î Q Ì ¡q  with { } , <1, 0 ,c
c
gn gn gnGN
GN
p p p
ì ü
Q º >í ý
î þ
å  
and
( , )
1 0.
Î
= - >å
c
GN gn
g n GN
p p  The M index is bounded and continuous. Moreover, it can always be 
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estimated by 
1 1
ˆ
ˆ ˆ log ,
ˆ ˆ= = · ·
æ ö
= ç ÷ç ÷
è ø
åå
G N
gn
T gn
g n g n
p
M p
p p
 where ˆ / ,gn gnp T T= ˆ / ,g gp T T· ·= ˆ / ,n np T T· ·=  and 
0log(0) 0.=   
As is shown in Proposition 2 in the Appendix, under assumptions A1 to A3, ˆplim .TM M=  An 
implication of this consistency result is that ˆ TM  converges in probability to 0 if and only if pgn = pg• p•n 
for all g and n.  Moreover, whenever two cities are to be ranked according to M, the implicit ordering 
from ˆ TM convergences in probability to the ordering induced by M.  
The relation between Kullback-Leibler discrepancy measures and likelihood-ratio statistics for 
testing independence across categorical variables in contingency tables is well known (Kullback, 1959, p. 
158) . Here, to implement the likelihood ratio statistic for the independence of racial status and school 
membership, an additional parametric assumption on the conditional density for covariates x is 
sufficient: 
A8 : ( ) ( )| , | , ;x x=f g n f g n j  such that  
1 1
( ) ( | , ; )x x
= =
= åå
G N
gn
g n
f f g n pj and jÎ ¡kj does not 
depend on q . 
Consider testing for the independence of race and school membership, i.e. 0 : gn g nH p p p· ·=  for all 
( , ) ,cg n GNÎ  versus 1 : .gn g nH p p p· ·¹  Let ( )ˆ ˆ,l q j  be the log-likelihood evaluated at the maximum 
likelihood (hereafter ML) estimator, and let ( )0 0ˆ ˆ,l q j  be the log-likelihood for the model under H0 
evaluated at the restricted ML estimator, so that ( ) ( )( )0 0ˆ ˆˆ ˆ2log( ) 2 , ,l- = - -l lq j q j  is the log-
likelihood ratio statistic and l is the likelihood ratio.  
Remark 2 : Under assumptions A1, A2, A3 and A8 , log( )ˆ TM T
l-
=  .    
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Therefore, ˆ TM  is a monotonic transformation of the likelihood-ratio statistic for testing statistical 
independence between school membership and racial status. This implies that the ordering across cities 
provided by comparisons of city-specific log-likelihood ratios divided by city size, is uniquely defined by 
the seven ordinal properties that characterize the M index as shown by Frankel and Volij (2009). Note 
that ( )log l-  is less appealing than ˆ TM  as a measure of segregation because the ordering induced by 
ˆ
TM  is size invariant, while the ordering induced by -log(l) is sensitive to sample size for any given set 
of relative frequencies.  
The value -log(l) can be seen to be a particular case of a general KL divergence test for the null 
hypothesis that r independent samples are drawn from an identical distribution, whose functional form 
is known up to a vector of parameters of dimension k. Kupperman (1957) showed that, under certain 
regularity conditions, this general KL divergence test is asymptotically distributed as chi-square 
distribution with( 1)r k-  degrees of freedom.11 For the statistical model set up in the previous section, it 
is possible to invoke earlier well-known results on the properties of the l statistic under the null of 
independence to show that 2( 1)( 1)ˆ2
d
T G NTM c - -¾¾®  (see Theorem 1 in the Appendix). 
In many practical situations, the hypothesis of indepedence or absence of segregation will be false, 
so that the relevant statistical properties for the index of segregation will be those under the true 
alternative. Salicrú et al. (1994) studied the asymptotic distribution of a family of estimators for which 
KL divided by sample size T is a limiting case. Using the delta method, they find square-root 
convergence to a normal distribution under the alternative. In Theorem 2 in the Appendix it is shown 
that, under assumptions A1, A2, A3, and A8, if gn g np p p· ·¹  for at least one ( , ) ,
cg n GNÎ  then 
( )1/2 ˆ TT M M-  converges in distribution to a normal distribution with mean zero and positive variance. 
                                                
11 Morales et al. (1995) consider ˆ TM as a particular case of a more general family of divergence measures between two 
consistent estimates of a discrete distribution. They find that, under the null, the chi-square distribution is an asymptotic 
approximation for all members of the family. 
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The asymptotic power of ˆ TM  can be estimated for fixed alternatives using this last result . Note, 
however, that the normal approximation will likely be poor if the sample is not large, and bootstrap 
inference may provide better approximations to the small sample distribution of ˆ TM . 
III.2. Estimation and Asymptotics of Conditional Segregation 
When a sample of iid observations of size T is available, estimation of decomposition (3) can be 
carried out using the principle of analogy. The following four estimators will be considered: 
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where ˆˆ ˆ( , , )g a b are estimates for ( , , ).g a b  For the case in which all covariates x are discrete and 
partition the set of schools, the sample analogues of decomposition (4) require no functional form 
assumptions for the densities of the variables. In this case: 
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and ˆ ˆ ˆ= +B WT T TM M M  always. 
The remainder of this section is devoted to the properties of these estimators. Results for the case 
in which all covariates are discrete and for the case in which at least one covariate is not discrete are 
presented in III.2.1 and III.2.2, respectively. 
III.2.1. Estimation and Asymptotics of District versus School Segregation 
Decomposition (4) aims to answer to what extent race segregation at district level can explain a 
17 
 
significant amount of school segregation by race. In this section, the statistical properties of the 
estimators for decomposition (4), ˆ BTM  and ˆ ,
W
TM are studied.
12 
The term ˆ BTM  is itself a mutual information index so that it converges in probability to the KL 
measure BM  and, by Remark 2, can be motivated as the likelihood-ratio test for the independence 
between race and district membership. Asymptotic distributions for ˆ BTM  both in the presence and the 
absence of dependence between race and district membership can be obtained using Theorems 1 and 2 
in the Appendix after a trivial change in notation.  
The within-term ˆ WTM  can also be motivated as a likelihood-ratio test. Consider testing for the 
independence of race and school membership within any district d, i.e. 
0 | | |: ,d dgn d g d n dH p p p· ·= ( ), , 1,..., ,
c
d dg n GN d DÎ =  versus the alternative 1 | | |: · ·¹d dgn d g d n dH p p p for at 
least one combination ( , , ).dg n d  Let { } { }( )|ˆ ˆ,g n d dl p p··  be the log-likelihood evaluated at the ML 
estimator, and let { } { }( )0 0|ˆ ˆ,g n d dl p p··  be the log-likelihood for the model under H0 evaluated at the 
restricted ML estimator, so that { } { }( ) { } { }( )( )0 0| |ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ2log( ) 2 , ,W gnd d g nd dl p p l p pl ·· ··- = - -  is the log-
likelihood ratio statistic and Wl is the likelihood ratio.   
Remark 3: Suppose that assumptions A1 to A8 hold, and that the vector x includes only district 
code d. Then 
log( )ˆ
W
W
TM T
l-=  .   
Remark 3 provides an intuitive statistical interpretation for ˆ WTM . We are not aware of any other 
within-groups term in a decomposition of an index of segregation so closely related to a classical 
statistical test. Remark 3 can be applied to any cluster of school districts , such as cities or regions, so that 
                                                
12 By interchanging the notation for groups and organizational units, the results presented here can be applied to 
decompositions when the set of racial groups is partitioned into supergroups. 
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the within terms in the resulting decompositions can be interpreted as monotone transformations of 
likelihood-ratio tests for the independence between race and school membership within the districts of 
the corresponding cluster. 
The discussion of the discrete case ends with two results which characterize the asymptotic 
properties of ˆ .WTM  Firstly, it is shown in Theorem 3a in the Appendix that, under general conditions, if 
| | |  for all ( , , ),g n d g d n dp p p g n d· ·= then ˆ
W
TTM converges in distribution to a quadratic form. Intuitively, 
under absence of segregation, the index of segregation for each district converges by Theorem 1 in the 
Appendix to a chi-square distribution. Since the within term ˆ WTTM is a weighted average of these terms, 
it does not generally converge to a chi-square distribution. Secondly, if | | |gnd g d n dp p p· ·¹ for at least one 
( , , ),g n d then ( )1/2 ˆ W WTT M M-  converges in distribution to a normal distribution with zero mean and 
positive variance (see Theorem 3b in the Appendix).  
III.2.2. Conditional Segregation with Non-Discrete Covariates 
Although decomposition (3) includes decomposition (4) as a special case, the former cannot be 
considered a true generalization of the latter. The reason is that, while in the finite-covariates situation 
no restrictive functional -form assumptions for the conditional densities are required to implement 
decomposition (3), in the presence of countable or continuous covariates identifying functional-form 
assumptions are implicit in parametric assumptions A4 to A7. This has two important implications. 
Firstly, the sum ˆˆ ˆˆ ˆ ˆ( , ) ( , )+B WT TM Mg a a b  need not be equal to ˆ TM  for small samples. Second, there is 
generally no monotonous relation between the likelihood-ratio test and ˆ ˆ ˆ( , )BTM g a  and ˆˆ ˆ( , )
W
TM a b .  
Clearly, the fact that ˆ ˆ ˆ( , )BTM g a  and ˆˆ ˆ( , )
W
TM a b  are unrelated to likelihood-ratio tests does not 
imply that they cannot be interpreted as statistical tests. The asymptotic properties of both estimators 
are next studied under different hypotheses, therefore providing their asymptotic motivation as 
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statistical tests. Sufficient conditions for asymptotic normality for ( )1/2 0 0ˆ ˆ ˆ( , ) ( , )B BTT M M-g a g a  and 
( )1/2 0 0ˆˆ ˆ( , ) ( , )W WTT M M-a b a b are given in the Appendix in Theorem 4 and Theorem 5, respectively. 
Asymptotic normality for ˆ ˆ ˆˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ( , ) ( , )= -W BT T TM M Mg a g a  and ˆ ˆˆ ˆ ˆˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ( , , ) ( , ) ( , )= +
B W
T T TM M Mg a b g a a b  
follows directly. Note that these results apply to any set of consistent estimators for ( , , ).g a b  For ML 
estimators, the sufficient conditions will be satisfied under general regularity conditions.  
 
IV. U.S. SCHOOL SEGREGATION 
 
During the past decades, the U.S. has become increasingly racially and ethnically diverse, due to 
higher fertility and/or immigration rates among minorities, which have led to a faster population 
growth than that of the white population. The demographic advances of Hispanics and Asians are 
concentrated in certain parts of the country, while scarcely apparent in many others.13  The main 
objective of this section is to illustrate the usefulness of the decompositions proposed in this paper to 
analyze racial school segregation patterns under the described changing environment. 
 
IV.1. Data 
We use the Common-Core of Data (CCD) compiled by the National Center for Educational 
Statistics (NCES). This dataset contains school enrolment records according to racial/ethnic group from 
all public schools in the United States. Results are reported for the school years 1989 -90 (the first year 
for which complete enrolment data is available) and 2005-06. Schools are retrospectively assigned Core 
Based Statistical Area (CBSA) codes based on 2005 ZIP codes so that comparisons over time can be 
made, without changes in city boundary definitions affecting the results.14 The sample is restricted to 
                                                
13 The terms white, black, Asian and Native American  are used throughout this sect ion to refer to non-Hispanic members of 
these racial groups. Asians include Native Hawaiian and Pacific Islanders; Native Americans include American Indians and 
Alaska Natives (Innuit or Aleut). The term Hispanic is an ethnic rather than a racial category since Hispanic persons may 
belong to any race. The term racial group is used throughout to refer to each of these five racial/ethnic categories.  
14 CBSAs were published by the Office of Management and Budget in 2003 and refer collectively to urban clusters of at least 
10,000 people. They replace the Metropolitan Statistical Areas (MSA s) which were used during the 1950-2000 period.  
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open regular schools15 located in 960 CBSA codes –referred to as “cities”– in the 50 states and the 
District of Columbia. This covers approximately 74% of the student population attending U.S. public 
schools in 2005. 
There is full information for all targeted schools in 2005. For 1989, however, a number of schools 
in a few states failed to report the data. As a consequence, data for 1989 only includes 839 cities.16 
Unless otherwise specified, results pertain to those schools for which racial and ethnic information is 
available both in 1989 and in 2005. Focusing on the schools which provide information in both years 
probably gives a fairer comparison between the distributions observed in 1989 and in 2005, since it does 
not include those schools which reported in 2005 but had failed to do so in 1989. However, 
interpretability of the results is also potentially compromised by the fact that some new schools were 
created whilst others disappeared between 1989 and 2005. Nevertheless, use of all observations does not 
significantly change the results (available upon request), suggesting that the selection mechanisms at 
work are not driving the results of our analysis.  
IV.2. Racial School Segregation in the U.S.: 1989 and 2005 
Table 1 presents the 1989 and 2005 school enrolment by race, the overall racial compositions in 
the U.S. urban public schools, and the M index of overall racial school segregation. Native American, 
Asian, black, and Hispanic students already made up 34.8% of the total enrolment in 1989. Since growth 
rates in minority enrolment were larger than among whites, by 2005 minorities accounted for almost 
half, 48.05%, of total enrolment. Although all minority racial groups increased their share at the expense 
of white students, the largest increases are by far from Hispanics, who, in 2005, were already the largest 
minority group in U.S. public schools. 
The last row of Table 1 presents the M index, which measures the expected information of the 
                                                
15 These are all operational schools, except those focused on vocational, special, or other alternative types of education. 
16 Reardon et al. (2000) study the public school population between 1989 and 1995 in 217 out of 323 MSAs, as defined by the 
Census Bureau in 1993. Frankel and Volij (2009) present results only for the 2005/2006 school year, restricting the sample to 
districts in CBSAs with at least two schools which serve grades K-12. Thus, the three papers study a similar phenomenon, 
although ours covers a larger population during a longer period. 
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message that transforms the set of U.S. racial shares presented in the previous panel of Table 1 to the set 
of schools’ racial shares. In 1989, the index of segregation (multiplied by 100) was 43.92, and the index 
increased by 11.3% to 48.90 between 1989 and 2005.  
Table 1  
IV.3. District vs. School Segregation in the U.S. 
Schools are organized into a set of school districts which are themselves organized into a set of 
cities.17 Thus, the overall index of segregation can be decomposed into three terms. The first term 
results from differences in racial shares between the cities and the national racial shares, so that it can be 
referred to as BC (Between Cities segregation). The second term captures differences in racial shares 
between the cities and the educational districts, and is referred to as WC (Within Cities segregation). 
Finally, the last term in the decomposition captures differences in racial shares between the districts and 
the schools, and is referred to as WD (Within Districts segregation). Table 2 presents the decomposition 
of overall racial school segregation into the three components both for 1989 and 2005. The results are in 
line with those reported in previous empirical studies. First ly, the BC term, closely linked to parental 
choices of residence at city level, contributes the most to overall school segregation. Secondly, the WD 
term, closely linked to the district educational authorities’ decisions, is a relatively small part –around 
19%– of overall segregation. 
Table 2  
Theorems 2 and 3 from the Appendix can be invoked to justify the use of resampling methods. 
Table 2 presents 5% confidence intervals based on the normal approximation. Upper and lower limits 
are obtained from bootstrap estimates of the variance, using 250 bootstrap samples of each individual 
student racial status within schools. Given the very high level of aggregation and the large sample sizes, 
it is hardly surprising to confirm that all terms are significantly different from zero. Looking at 
                                                
17 The data  originally consist of 5,834 districts in 1989 and 7,704 districts in 2005. For the common sample there are 5,429 
districts. 
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differences between the 1989 and 2005 results, there is supportive evidence that the increases observed 
in all terms are also significant, and of the same order of magnitude: close to 12% for BC, 11.5% for 
WC, and 10% for WD.18 
Aggregation at national level may mask large differences in segregation at city and district level. By 
Remark 3, both WC and WD can be interpreted as likelihood ratios for the null of absence of 
segregation in any of the more than 800 cities, or the more than 5,000 districts. Clearly, this does not 
imply that there is segregation in all cities and all districts. A direct way  to find out how many cities and 
districts have significant levels of segregation is to look directly at each city and each district’s local index 
of racial segregation. By Remark 2, these indices are formal tests for the independence of racial and 
organizational unit status within each geographical cluster. The distribution of these local indices under 
the absence of segregation can be approximated using the chi-square distribution with the appropriate 
degrees of freedom. A naïve procedure to assess how many cities and districts present significant levels 
of segregation applies the test to each city and district and then counts those cities and districts for 
which the null cannot be rejected at a given confidence level. Using this procedure with a 1% confidence 
interval, segregation is found to be significant in all cities and the vast majority (99%) of districts in both 
years. This approach has the well-known drawback that, by design, we should expect a positive number 
of rejections even if the null is always true. Several corrections have been proposed in the literature (see, 
for example, Romano et al., 2008). Using the Holm correction, segregation remains significant in all 
cities and in most districts, although the percentage of districts for which segregation is significantly 
different from zero slightly decreases (98%).  
A related question is whether segregation levels are very different among cities and districts. Given 
that the M index represents a unique ordering of clusters of the organizational units satisfying a set of 
desirable properties, it is useful to address this question by assessing whether the ranking of cities and 
the ranking of districts is significant. There are several ways to define ranking significance. For brevity, 
                                                
18 Using all schools in 1989 and 2005 results in slightly larger increases for WC:  around 16%.  
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here we only mean whether the position in the ranking for each of the cities and each of the districts is 
precisely estimated. One simple way to address this issue is by bootstrapping the rankings and reporting 
basic bootstrap confidence limits for the ranking for each city  and district. Figure 1 presents this 
information graphically. The y-axis for each plot shows both the index values and 10% bootstrap 
confidence limits for each city and district by year. Cities and districts with the lowest levels of 
segregation are ranked first so that they are represented to the left on the x-axis. Thus, all graphs present 
a positive slope by construction.  Figure 1 shows that school districts with large segregation values tend 
to be ranked more precisely than school districts with low segregation values. The rank of those districts 
with the lowest levels of segregation is, in fact, very poorly estimated and its confidence intervals often 
range in the hundreds of positions. Regarding cities, however, the availability of large samples allows us 
to obtain precise estimates of the rank in most cases. Finally, a note of caution is due regarding the 
interpretation of Figure 1: since the ordering is specific for each year, Figure 1 does not show ranking 
dynamics between 1989 and 2005. 
Figure 1 
 
IV.4. Multigroup Conditional School Segregation: The Role of Income, Wages, and 
Teachers per Pupil. 
This subsection considers to what extent the measures of WC and WD presented so far are due to 
the statistical association between racial group membership and socioeconomic covariates using the 
methodological framework developed in subsection III.2.2. We focus on two sets of controls. Firstly, it 
has been argued in section II.2 that, given that household income is a potential determinant of 
residential and school choice, it would be interesting to identify the extent to which multigroup school 
segregation arises from income differences across races. In addition, residential choices may potentially 
be affected by the composition of earnings into wage and non-wage income in the presence of credit 
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market restrictions. Therefore, we would hope to identify the extent to which multigroup school 
segregation arises from race differentials in the wage to income ratio. Secondly, the impact of class size, 
or its inverse –the number of teachers per pupil– on academic performance and other outcomes has 
long been subject to debate in academic studies and political circles, where t he reduction of class sizes is 
frequently seen as an operational way for educational authorities to effectively increase resources in 
schools with special needs. At the same time, parents aware of the potential positive effects of small 
class size on their children’s educational achievements will likely make their residential and school 
choices dependent on how schools differ in this dimension. Thus, it would be interesting to identify the 
extent to which multigroup school segregation arises from class size differences across schools. Our 
empirical illustration tentatively addresses these two issues by merging the CCD data with aggregated 
measures of income and wages at county level. We specifically study the contribution to the 
measurements of WC and WD in 2005 of the discrepancy in the racial mix by city and by district for 
different values of average annual income per capita, at county level average annual wages per job at 
county level, and teachers per pupil at school level.19  
Both for WC and WD, we estimate components ( , )BM g a  and ( , ) ( , )= -W BM M Mg a g a  using 
estimates of conditional densities ( | ; )xf g a  based on logistic regressions carried out at district and 
school level. In particular, for each racial group at city (district) level we assume that 
( ) 1'( | ; ) 1 xx --= + g ii if g e aa  where x i  includes per capita income, wages per job, and teachers per pupil 
at county (school) level in addition to dummy variables for city (district) to control for between city 
(district) segregation. Logistic regressions for each of the five racial groups are run, using as the 
dependent variable in each of the regressions the logistic transformation of the observed frequency of 
                                                
19 Since income includes non-wage income, income and wages are not perfectly collinear. The variable teachers per pupil  at 
school level can be constructed using the information on the number of teachers and pupils reported by most schools since 
2002.  County codes, also available from 2002 onwards, allow us to merge the 2005 dataset with the 2004 annual per capita 
personal income and average wage per job by county published by the Bureau of Economic Activity of the U.S. Department 
of Commerce. In our county sample, the correlation between the two variables is 0.73. 
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students of a given race in a given district (school), and as controls the averages at district (school) level 
for income, wages, and teachers per pupil, in addition to the city (district) dummies. Table 3 presents a 
summary of the results.  
Table 3  
Estimated marginal effects can be interpreted as the expected change in probability (in percentage 
terms) associated with a one-percentage increase in each of the controls. For example, a 1% increase in 
per capita personal income at district level is associated with a 0.83% expected increase in the probability 
of a student being white, and a 0.32% expected decrease in the probability of a student being black. At 
district level, increases in per capita income ceteris paribus are associated to increases in whites and Asians 
and decreases in blacks and Hispanics, whilst increases in wages per job are associated to decreases in 
whites and increases in blacks and Hispanics. These results arguably reflect both the higher probability 
of black and Hispanic students having parents who have lower overall per capita income and who are 
more likely to be salaried workers. Increases in teachers per pupil are associated with decreases in all 
minority groups. With respect to whites, the point estimate of the relation is positive, although 
statistically not significant. At school level, increases in county per capita income are associated again 
with significant increases in whites and significant decreases in blacks. The signs of the estimates for the 
other groups are similar to those obtained for the district level regression, but the estimates are not 
significant. With respect to wages per job, results are again similar for whites, Hispanic and blacks, while 
the parameter estimates for Native American and Asians are not significant. Finally, the effect of 
increases in teachers per pupil is reversed for blacks at school level: a 1% increase in the teachers per 
pupil in a school increases the probability that a given student is black by 0.05%. Obviously, a causality 
interpretation should not be attached to these estimates. Nevertheless, the strong significance of these 
effects suggests that a significant part of WC and WD stems from the statistical association of these 
covariates with race. This central issue is addressed in the last panel of Table 3.  
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Once estimates aˆ  are obtained using the logistic regressions carried out at district and school 
level, the term ( , )BM g a  can be estimated using ˆ ˆ ˆ( , )BTM g a  with 1ˆ ˆˆ ( ,..., ) .· ·=
t
Gp pg  The term “All 
controls” represents ˆ ˆ ˆ( , )BTM g a at city and district level (segregation at city and district level stemming 
from the statistical association between race membership and per capita personal income, wages per job, 
and teachers per pupil).  Asymptotic standard errors (using the results from Theorem 4 in the Appendix) 
are shown in parenthesis. Results show that most (around 64%) of WC while over 20% of WD is 
accounted for by these three covariates. These effects are significant even in the within-districts case. 
Finally, to evaluate the potentially attenuating effect on segregation of teachers per pupil, the conditional 
segregation terms are simulated as if this control had no effect. The average effect remains the same for 
WD, while it decreases very slightly for WC.  
 
V. CONCLUSIONS 
 
The starting point of this paper is the use of the Kullback-Leibler notion of discrepancy (Kullback 
and Leibler, 1951) to propose a decomposition of the Mutual Information index of segregation, M, first 
introduced by Theil and Finizza (1971) to isolate segregation conditional on any vector of 
socioeconomic characteristics. Estimators for M and the terms in its decomposition are proposed, and 
their asymptotic properties are obtained. The usefulness of the approach is illustrated by looking at 
patterns of multigroup school segregation in the U.S. for the 1989-90 and 2005-06 school years. Several 
interesting results stem from direct application of the tools developed in the paper. 
Overall multigroup school segregation, which is measured as the discrepancy between the set of 
U.S. racial shares to the set of schools’ racial shares, is significantly positive and has significantly 
increased during the 15-year period. In the decomposition of overall segregation into between-cities, 
within-cities, and within-districts segregation, the findings are in line with previous studies: between-
cities segregation, closely linked to parental choices of residence at city level, contributes the most to 
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overall school segregation. In contrast, within-districts segregation, potentially linked to policies by the 
district educational authorities, represents around 19% of overall segregation. All terms in the 
decomposition of overall segregation are significantly different from zero, and evidence is found that all 
of them significantly increased during the period.  
Aggregation at national level may mask large differences in segregation at city and district level. 
However, when segregation is studied recursively by city and district, it is found to be significant in all 
cities and the vast majority of districts in both years. A related question is whether the ranking of cities 
and the ranking of districts is significant. Using bootstrap techniques, it is found that the rank of those 
districts with the lowest levels of segregation is, in fact, very poorly estimated and confidence intervals 
often range in the hundreds of positions. Regarding the ranking of cities, however, the availability of 
large samples allows us to obtain precise rank estimates for most cities. Finally, we study to what extent 
the measures of within-cities and within-districts segregation are due to the statistical association 
between racial group membership and three continuous variables: annual per capita county income, 
wages per job at county level, and teachers per pupil at school level. Results show that around 64% and 
20% of, respectively, within-cities and within-districts segregation is accounted for by these three 
covariates, and that the effects are strongly significant. These results illustrate why, for both explanatory 
and policy reasons, it is important to identify the extent to which the value of segregation arises from 
income and other socioeconomic characteristics. Results suggest that to reduce school segregation levels 
it may prove necessary to reduce income and other inequalities across races. 
 
APPENDIX 
Proposition 1: Under assumptions A1 to A7, ( , ) ( , )= +B WM M Mg a a b  where  
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Proposition 2:  Under assumptions A1 to A3, ˆplim .TM M=  
Proof. We first note that by direct application of Lemma 1 in Rao (1957), the sample frequencies ˆ gngn
T
p
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Let 0q be the vector containing the true probabilities. Since m(q  ) is continuous at 0 ,=q q by the Slutsky theorem it 
follows that 0ˆˆplim plim ( ) ( ) .= = =TM m m Mq q       x 
 
Theorem 1:  Suppose that A1, A2, A3, and A8 hold. If pgn = pg• p•n, for all ( , ) ,
cg n GNÎ  then:  
 2( 1)( 1)ˆ2 .
d
T G NTM c - -¾¾®  
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Proof. We first note that the l statistic is also the likelihood ratio for testing H0: pg|n = pg•, g = 1,…,G – 1, n = 1,…,N, 
versus the two-sided alternative H1: pg|n ?  pg• where the quantities T•n are assumed to be constants. Direct application 
of Theorem 7 in Neyman (1949) implies that 22log( ) d dfl c- ¾¾® where df = (G – 1)N – (G – 1) = (G – 1)(N – 1) . 
The proof then follows from Proposition 2.       x 
 
Theorem 2:  Suppose that assumptions A1, A2, A3, and A8 hold.  If gn g np p p· ·¹ pgn ?  pg• p•n for at least 
one ( , ) ,cg n GNÎ  then ( ) ( )1/2 ˆ 0, 'dTT M M N m m- ¾¾® D SD  where  
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Proof. We first note that ( ) ( )1/2 0ˆ 0,dT Nq q- ¾¾® S (see, for example, Serfling, 1980, Theorem 2.7, p.109). To 
prove Theorem 2, we will use two lemmata:  
 
 Lemma 1: Suppose that qˆ  is ( )1, .AN Tq - S If ( )m q  has a non-zero partial derivative at 0 ,=q q  
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 Proof. This is a direct from Theorem 3.3A in Serfling (1980).    x 
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 The result follows after some 
algebraic manipulation after noticing that 
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In view of Lemmata 1 and 2, to prove Theorem 2 we only need to show that if pgn ?  pg• p•n for at least one 
( , ) cg n GNÎ , then 10 .NGm -D ¹  Since 
1 1 1 1
1 1 1 1
1 ,
G N N G
GN gn Gn gN
g n n g
p p p p
- - - -
= = = =
= - - -åå å å  if pgn = pg• p•n for all ( , ) cg n GNÎ , 
then .GN G Np p p· ·= Thus, if pgn ?  pg• p •n for at least one ( , )
cg n GNÎ , then there must be at least another 
combination (i , j ) such that pij  ?  pi• p•j. Assume, wlog, that pGN ?  pG• p•N . We can now prove by contradiction that 
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pGN ?  pG• p•N . So it must be true that if pgn ?  pg• p•n for at least one ( , ) cg n GNÎ then 10 .NGm -D ¹  x 
 
Theorem 3: Suppose that assumptions A1 to A8 hold, and that the covariates vector x includes only 
district code d. Denote by { }( , ) : 1,..., , ,( , ) ( , )cd d d d d dGN g n g G n S g n G N= = Î ¹  the set of all ra ce and 
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for all d = 1,…, D, and | |( ) and ( )· ·g d d nd dp pq q  are defined in a similar way to ( ) and ( ).· ·g np pq q  
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Proof. We first prove part (a) and then prove part (b). In both cases, we exploit the fact that the within term WM can 
be expressed as a well-behaved function of the sample relative frequencies. Since these are the ML estimators for the 
actual probabilities, we have (see, for example, Serfling, 1980, pp.109) that ( ) ( )1/2 0ˆ 0,- ¾¾® SdW W WT Nq q  where 
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0
Wq  is the vector with the actual probabilities. To prove Theorem 3a, we will use Lemma 2 and the following 
corollary from Theorem 3.3B in Serfling (1980): 
 Lemma 3: Suppose that ˆ KTm Î¡  is ( )0 1, .AN T mm - S  If ( )g m  is a real-valued function possessing 
continuous partial derivativ es of second order in a neighbourhood of 0 ,m m=  with the first order partial derivatives 
vanishing at 0 ,m m=  but with the second order partial derivatives not all vanishing at 0.m m=  Then 
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that condition (B) holds, first note that Lemma 2 can be used to show that the partial derivative with respect to |g n dp  
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the result follows if it is shown that ( )W Wm q  has a non-zero partial derivative at 
0 .=W Wq q  Now, using a similar 
argument to the argument used in the proof of Theorem 2, given that 
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Theorem 4:  Suppose that assumptions A1 to A5 hold and that the vector of covariates x includes at 
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least one countable or continuous variable. Let 0 0( , )g a  be the true parameter vectors of the data 
generating process and define 
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Therefore, to prove the theorem we only need to prove that   
  1 0 0
1 *, * *, *
ˆ ˆ( ) ( ) o(1).-
=
ì ü¶ ¶ï ï- + - =í ý
¶ ¶ï ïî þ
å
T
B B
i
h hT
g a g a
g g a a
g a
 
Given (R3), this condition is satisfied if 1
1 *, *
-
=
¶
¶å
T
B
i
h
T
g a
g
and 1
1 *, *
-
=
¶
¶å
T
B
i
h
T
g a
a
are asymtotically normal, which 
follows by the squeeze theorem from asymptotic normality for 1
1 ˆ ˆ,
-
=
¶
¶å
T
B
i
h
T
g a
g
and 1
1 ˆ ˆ,
-
=
¶
¶å
T
B
i
h
T
g a
a
, (this is due to R3 
and continuity in the partial derivatives) and asymptotic normality for 
0 0
1
1 ,
-
=
¶
¶å
T
B
i
h
T
g a
g
 and 1
1 ˆ ˆ,
-
=
¶
¶å
T
B
i
h
T
g a
a
(due to 
the central limit theorem).          x 
 
Theorem 5:  Suppose that assumptions A1 to A7 hold, and that the vector of covariates x includes at 
least one countable or continuous variable. Let 0 0( , )a b  be the true parameter vectors of the data 
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generating process, and define 
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 (R6) 0 0ˆˆplim  and plim .= =a a b b  
Then,  ( ) ( )1/2 20 0ˆˆ ˆ( , ) ( , ) 0, .s- ¾¾®dW WT WT M M Na b a b    
 
Proof. It is formally similar to the proof of Theorem 4.       
34 
 
REFERENCES 
Aslund, O., and O.N. Skans (2009), “How to measure segregation conditional on the distribution of 
covariates,” Journal of Population Economics 22(4):971-981. 
Boisso, D., K. Hayes, J. Hirschberg, and J. Silber (1994), “Occupational Segregation in the 
Multidimensional Case: Decomposition and Test of Significance,” Journal of Econometrics 61: 
161-171. 
Carrington, W.J.,  and K.R. Troske  (1997), “On Measuring Segregation in Samples with Small Units,” 
Journal of Business and Economic Statistics, 15: 402-409. 
Clotfelter, C. (1979), “Alternative Measures of School Desegregation: A Methodological Note”, Land Economics, 
54: 373-380. 
Frankel, D and O. Volij (2009), “Measuring School Segregation,” mimeo, November 2009.  
Flückiger, Y. and Silber, J. (1999), The Measurement of Segregation in the Labor Force, Heidelberg, Physica-
Verlag. 
Hellerstein, J.K., and D. Neumark (2008), “Workplace Segregation in the United States: Race, Ethnicity, 
and Skill,” Review of Economics and Statistics  90(3): 459-477.  
Herranz, N., Mora, R., and Ruiz-Castillo, J. (2005), “An Algorithm to Reduce the Occupational Space in 
Gender Segregation Studies,” Journal of Applied Econometrics 20: 25-37 
James, D.R. and K.E. Taeuber (1985), “Measures of Segregation,” in G. Schmid and R. Weitzel (eds.), 
Sex Discrimination and Equal Opportunity: The Labor Market and Employment Policy, London, Gower 
Publishing Company. 
Kakwani, N.C. (1994), “Segregation by Sex: Measurement and Hypothesis Testing,” Research on Economic 
Inequality 5: 1-26. 
Kalter, F. (2000), “Measuring Segregation and Controlling for Independent Variables,” Working Paper 
19-2000, Manheimer Zentrum für Europäische Sozialforschung. 
Kullback, S. (1959), Information Theory and Statistics, John Wiley and Sons, NY. 
Kullback, S., and R.A. Leibler (1951), “On Information and Sufficiency,” The Annals of Mathematical 
Statistics 22(1):79-86.  
Kupperman, M. (1957), “Further applications of information theory to multivariate analysis and 
statistical inference,” Dissertation, Graduate Council of George Washington Univ. 
Massey, D. and N. Denton (1988), “The Dimensions of Residential Segregation,” Social Forces 67: 281-
315. 
Mora, R. and Ruiz-Castillo, J. (2003), “Additively Decomposable Segregation Indices. The Case of 
Gender Segregation By Occupations and Human Capital Levels In Spain,” Journal of Economic 
Inequality 1: 147-179. 
Mora, R. and Ruiz-Castillo, J. (2004), “Gender Segregation by Occupations in the Public and the Private 
Sectors. The Case of Spain In 1977 and 1992,” Investigaciones Económicas XXVIII: 399-428. 
Mora, R. and Ruiz-Castillo, J. (2009), “Entropy-based Segregation Indices,” Working Paper 09-32, 
Economics Series 18, Universidad Carlos III. 
Morales, D., L. Pardo, I. Vajda (1995), “Asymptotic divergence of estimates of discrete distributions,” 
Journal of Statistical Planning and Inference 48(3): 347-369. 
Neyman, J. (1949), “Contribution to the theory of the 2c test,” in J. Neyman (ed.)  Proceedings of the First 
Berkeley Symposium on Mathematical Statistics and Probability , Univ. of California Press, Berkeley, 
547-566. 
Rao, C.R. (1957), “Maximum Likelihood Estimation for the Multinomial Distribution,” The Indian Journal 
of Statistics (1933 -1960) 18:139-148. 
35 
 
Reardon, S., J. Yun and T. McNulty, (2000), “The Changing Structure of School Segregation: 
Measurement and Evidence of Multi-racial Metropolitan Area School Segregation, 1989-
1999,” Demography 37: 351-364. 
Reardon, S. and G. Firebaugh, (2002), “Measures of Multigroup Segregation,” Sociological Methodology 32: 
33-67. 
Rivkin, S.G. (1994), “Residential Segregation and School Integration,” Sociology of Education, 67:279-92. 
Romano, J.P., A.M. Shaikh, and M. Wolf (2008), “Formalized Data Snooping Based On Generalized 
Error Rates,” Econometric Theory 24(02):404-447. 
Salicrú, M., D. Morales, M.L. Menéndez and L. Pardo (1994), “On the applications of divergence type 
measures in testing statistical hypotheses,” Journal of Multivariate Analysis 51: 372-391. 
Serfling, R.J. (1980), Approximation Theorems of Mathematical Statistics, New York: John Wiley & Sons. 
Shorrocks, A. (1984), “Inequality Decomposition by Population Subgroups,” Econometrica 52: 1369-1385. 
Spriggs, W.E., and R.M. Williams (1996), “Logit Decomposition Analysis of Occupational Segregation: 
Results for the 1970s and 1980s,” The Review of Economics and Statistics 78: 348-355. 
Theil, H. and A.J. Finizza (1971), “A Note on the Measurement of Racial Integration of Schools by 
Means of Information Concepts,” Journal of Mathematical Sociology 1: 187-194. 
Theil, H. (1972), Statistical Decomposition Analys is, Amsterdam: North Holland.  
36 
 
 
Table 1. Urban Public School Enrolment, Racial Mix, and School Segregation in the U.S., 1989 :2005 
 
 
 
 No. of students (millions)  Racial Shares (%) 
 1989 2005 Change (%)  1989 2005 Change (%) 
Native American 0.18 0.31 70.36  0.68 0.89 0.20 
Asian 1.12 2.03 82.14  4.15 5.49 1.34 
Black 4.55 6.94 52.63  16.10 17.80 1.70 
Hispanic 3.75 8.39 123.95  13.85 23.87 10.02 
Non-white 9.59 17.68 84.26  34.78 48.05 13.27 
White 16.98 18.47 8.77  65.22 51.95 -13.27 
Total 26.57 36.14 36.03  100.00 100.00 0.00 
 
 
Mutual Information index of Segregation  
 1989 2005 Change  (%) 
M 43.92 48.90 11.33%  
    
Note: Ethnic shares are the percentages of students from every race/ethnic group. The terms Native American, Asian, Black, and White refer to 
non-Hispanic members of these racial groups. Asian includes Native Hawaiians and Pacific Islanders; Native American includes American Indians 
and Alaska Natives (Innuit or Aleut). The term Hispanic is an ethnic rather than a racial category since Hispanic persons may belong to any race. 
Total Non-white includes all categories except White. 
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Table 2. Between Cities, Within Cities, and Within Districts Segregation in the U.S. 
 1989  2005 
 Index Lower Bound Upper Bound  Index Lower Bound Upper Bound  
Between Cities 21.04 21.02 21.06  23.50 23.48 23.52 
  (% over total) 47.91    48.06   
Within Cities  14.71 14.69 14.72  16.40 16.38 16.42 
  (% over total) 33.49    33.54   
Within Districts 8.18 8.16 8.19  9.00 8.99 9.01 
  (% over total) 18.62    18.40   
Total 43.92 43.90 43.95  48.90 48.87 48.92 
Note: Ethnic shares are the percentages of students from every race/ethnic group. The terms Native American, Asian, Black, and White refer to 
non-Hispanic members of these racial groups. Asian includes Native Hawaiians and Pacific Islanders; Native American includes American Indians 
and Alaska Natives (Innuit or Aleut). The term Hispanic is an ethnic rather than a racial category since Hispanic persons may belong to any race. 
Total Non-white includes all categories except White. 
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Notes: 5% and 95% bounds obtained from 250 bootstrap replications
Levels and Upper and Lower Bounds
Rankings based on the Mutual Information Index
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Table 3. Multigroup Conditional School Segregation: The Role of Income, Wages, and Teachers per Pupil, 2005 
 
 
Fixed-Effects Logistics Regressions: Marginal Effects  a 
 
 
District Level Data 
(7419 districts, 923 cities) 
 Native American Asian Black Hispanic White 
Per-capita personal income 0.00 0.04*** -0.32*** -0.09*** 0.83*** 
Wages per job -0.01*** -0.003 0.62*** 0.14*** -1.48*** 
Teachers per pupil -0.02*** -0.08*** -0.15*** -0.15*** 0.10 
      
 
School Level Data 
(53174 schools, 7419 districts) 
 Native American Asian Black Hispanic White 
Per-capita personal income 0.003 0.01 -0.05 -0.14*** 0.18*** 
Wages per job -0.004 0.03* 0.14*** 0.19*** -0.35*** 
Teachers per pupil -0.01*** -0.06*** 0.05*** -0.01 -0.14*** 
 
 
The Decomposition of Within-Cities and Within-Districts Segregation b 
 
 Within Cities  Within Districts 
 Index % over Total    Index % over Total   
Total  16.72 100.00  9.07 100.00 
All Controls 10.67 (0.003) 63.78  1.93 (0.001) 21.25 
Income and Wages 10.69 (0.003) 63.92  1.93 (0.001) 21.32 
Conditional Segregation 6.06 36.22  7.14 78.75 
Notes:   
a District level regressions include city fixed effects. School level regressions include district fixed effects. Marginal effects are sample averages of 
the estimated partial derivative of each of the controls over the probability of belonging to each of the races and can be interpreted as the expected 
change in probability (in percentage terms) brought about by a one-percentage increase in the control. ***, **, and * denote parameter significant at 
1,5, and 10 significance level. 
b Total-Within Cities Index measures the expected information of the message that transforms the set of city ethnic shares to the set of district 
ethnic shares for the regressions sample. All controls-Within Cities captures segregation stemming from the statistical association between per-
capita personal income, wages per job, and teachers per pupil and race membership at district level. Income and Wages-Within Cities simulates the 
value of segregation stemming from the statistical association between income and wages as if teachers per pupil played no role. Conditional 
Segregation-Within Cities reports the difference between Total-Within Cities and All Controls-Within Cities. Total -Within District  Index measures 
the expected information of the message that transforms the set of district ethnic shares to the set of school ethnic shares for the regressions 
sample. All controls-Within Districts captures segregation stemming from the statistical association between per-capita personal income, hourly 
wages, and teachers per pupil and race membership at school level. Income and Wages-Within Districts simulates the value of segregation 
stemming from the statistical association between income and wages as if teachers per pupil played no role at school level. Conditional Segregation -
Within Districs reports the difference between Total -Within Districts and All Controls-Within Districts. Asymptotic Standard Errors are shown in 
parenthesis.. 
 
 
